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## INTRODUCTION TO A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF RELIGION.

THIRTY years ago, in concluding his epoch-making work on *Primitive Culture*, Edward B. Tylor expressed his belief that the application of the ethnographical method to the study of religion—a method of which he may be said to have given the first important illustration—would be the next great renovating force of the science of religion and of theology.<sup>1</sup>

The recent past has richly fulfilled Tylor's prophecy, for it is to the ethnographical study of religion from the genetic, evolutionary, point of view that is due the most essential parts of the progress recently made in the science and in the philosophy of religion.<sup>2</sup>

But however successful the investigations of the evolutionary ethnographer have been, and will continue to be, the results that have so far been secured and those upon which we may yet count cannot but leave unanswered what seems to our generation the more vital and the more pressing religious questions. A great work has been done—as to the main lines of its general conclusions it may be said to be completed—and now men's thoughts are turning in a new direction, towards a new department of science which, they expect, will take up the task and carry it to another turning point.

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<sup>1</sup> See *Primitive Culture*, Vol. II., p. 409.

<sup>2</sup> If we were to make a complete enumeration of the factors which contribute to the transformation now taking place in religious conceptions, the narrower, but substantial, results of the critical literary studies going under the name of *Higher Criticism* would call for particular mention.

The boundaries encompassing the student of what is usually called the *History of Religion* (including comparative ethnographical, genetic, and evolutionary studies), become apparent as soon as his task and the data with which he deals are clearly understood. Beliefs, rites, customs, ceremonials, as they are expressed in the social consciousness of a people, form his subject-matter. He is not concerned directly with the religious experiences of the individual, but only with the objectified products of it, as we see them in codes of worship and in the established social beliefs of a tribe or nation. He may therefore be able to tell us what are the original beliefs and the primitive worship; what is the order of succession in any given people, or in all peoples, of the community-beliefs and rites: he may show how certain of them have passed from one tribe to the other, as the result of conquest or of the pacific infiltration of mental habits of neighboring peoples or otherwise; he may compare these beliefs and practices as they exist contemporaneously among various peoples and as they are found also in the same people at various stages of culture; and in this comparison the more permanent and universal of them will separate themselves from the more temporary and local. This, the historical, comparative, method does. But it is beyond its scope to explain, for instance, why vicarious penances give satisfaction; why sexual rites are included in certain religious ceremonials, why religious feeling bursts forth at adolescence, why faith is a requirement of religious life, what the word *faith* means, why there are apparently individuals without religion and others who without religion could not, or would not, live. These and other questions of the same nature cannot be answered until we turn from the social religious manifestations to the *individual* religious consciousness, i. e., to the facts of *immediate religious experience*.

For brevity's sake we shall speak of the Psychological Method when referring to researches of the latter kind, although, to be accurate, the name should be *Individual* Psychological Method, since the researches which it is customary to call historical belong to the general field of Social Psychology.

It will not be a waste of time to show in detail how this psy-

chological method, with which a new chapter opens in the science of religion, differs from the social studies to which we are indebted for whatever knowledge has so far been acquired on religion, and what can be expected from it. Whatever differences exist between the two methods is a consequence of the fact that one deals with the *Community*-consciousness and the other with the *Individual*-consciousness.<sup>1</sup> The subject-matter of the latter is the feelings, the thoughts, the desires, the impulses, (as far as they enter into religion,) of the individual as he knows them *directly in himself*; while the former deals with the results of these desires, thoughts, and feelings, when they have been transformed in a process of social consolidation and set up as *objects* of belief (doctrines, beliefs), or as modes of worship (rites and ceremonies). The psychology of religion is concerned, for instance, with the actual feelings of sin, of repentance, of dependence, as you and I experience them; while the material of the various branches of the historical disciplines is the generalised beliefs, or rather a statement of the beliefs, of a social group, on sin, on repentance, or on dependence. The Calvinistic dogma that men are born in sin and doomed to everlasting perdition unless elected, and the actual twinge of conscience of a man acknowledging his moral uncleanness and the consciousness of pardon which may follow, are, it is evident, facts of different species.

The most important remark to be made concerning these two classes of facts is that the former owes its existence to the latter: corporate religion finds its birth in the individual religious experiences, in the same sense as a political organisation owes its existence to the individuals composing it. Beliefs and ceremonies are, in a way, higher products resulting from the elemental experiences of the individual. This does not mean that the experiences of the individual are independent of the social group of which he is a part. But only that it is always through and in the separate individuals that the social organism comes to its realisation, either conscious, or unconscious. We may say therefore that the Psychology of Religion deals with the formative elements of corporate

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<sup>1</sup> The term consciousness when applied to a community is evidently used in another sense than when referring to an individual.

religion, while the History of Religion deals with the complex products. There is here a difference similar to the one existing between the chemical elements, their properties, their modes of reaction and the complex chemical compounds. The problems of the one are not the problems of the other, and any effort devoted to the consideration of compounds, before the elements and their properties have been discovered, cannot possibly yield those important and speedy results which attend the endeavors of the scientist armed with the knowledge of the laws governing the action of the elements. And yet there is no way, at the start, before we know better, but to begin inquiries, in chemistry, upon highly complex substances and, in religion, upon social manifestations. The works of Spencer, Martineau, Caird, Pfleiderer, etc.,<sup>1</sup> belong to these preliminary attempts at a scientific and philosophical understanding of religion. We do not mention the pure historians whose purpose is merely to record the facts of corporate religion, and not to set forth its essence and its meaning; with him we have no business; his data are competent to answer the queries with which he sets out. Not so with the religious philosopher who, starting from data of the same kind, seeks in them answers to problems belonging properly to the individual psychology of religion. Why social come in point of time before individual studies, is too obvious to call for an explanation. We shall presently point out how incongruous and contradictory are the philosophical results of this unavoidably bungling beginning.

It seems to us that the chief problems of individual religious

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<sup>1</sup> Psychological considerations on individual religious consciousness are to be found in a great many old and recent books, some of which bear inscribed on their title page the words "Psychology of Religion," "based on Psychology," or the like. But the little they contain on individual religion is so far from being systematically set forth, or of conforming in any other way to the scientific canon, that no mention is required of them here. There have been published, however, in the philosophical journals a number of papers inspired more or less by a true scientific spirit and proceeding from persons acquainted with the recent advance of psychological science. See in particular the two papers of E. Starbuck in the *American Journal of Psychology* for 1897, subsequently republished in book form (*The Psychology of Religion*), and the author's own contribution in the same journal for 1896, pp. 309-385.

life may be put down, summarily and in a provisory form, as follows:

1. What are the motives of the religious activities; what needs do they express and what ends do they secure?—Particular attention will have to be paid, when dealing with the meaning of religious activities, to the incongruity oftentimes existing between practices and the needs they are supposed to express and satisfy, or the end they are expected to reach. This will be especially necessary with reference to practices of long standing, having become habitual or, perhaps, even instinctive.

2. The problem of the means by which the religious impulses express themselves and through which the needs seek their satisfaction.—The word “means” includes in this sense both the religious practices and the conceptions regarding the agent or agents, or the channels by or through which religious satisfaction is sought. It is here that belongs the problem of the Idea of God and of the conception of the dual nature of the forces at play in the world, a conception which is at the basis of the differentiation of human activities into religious and non-religious. Here also may be placed the question of the influence of the impulses and needs upon beliefs and the reversed one of beliefs upon needs.

The genesis and the evolution of the religious motives, of the needs and of the means would be a part of these two large problems.

3. The relation existing between the means (practices and beliefs) used and the satisfaction they produce or are expected to produce. Otherwise expressed, it is the problem of the *efficacy* of the religious means. It involves the gigantic question of the motor power of ideas; it is a chapter of psycho-physiological dynamics. The reader familiar with the current literature on Religion may grasp more fully the purport of this problem, if we say that it is a restatement, from the positivist, scientific point of view, of what is usually termed, very inadequately, the investigation of the relation of man to God.

Contributions towards the solution of these questions would mean the discovery of a key to many a time-honored puzzle, such

as the reason of the universality and persistency of religion ; the reason of the mongrel composition of religions ; the apparent or real antagonism existing in particular religions between their several constituting elements and between them and secular activities, —science, for instance ; the reason of the priceless value ascribed by many to religion and wherein it really lies at the various stages of its evolution and to what agencies its benefits are to be ascribed. The religious needs and their evolution, together with the source of their satisfaction, once known, it would become possible to intelligently encourage the transformation of existing religious forms that they may become better adapted to their function and to foresee their future.

Whether, and how thoroughly, these fundamental questions can be solved at present depends, it is evident, upon the degree of perfection reached by the general science of individual psychology. Although it is unfortunately true that that science is still in its infancy, the little it has already accomplished is sufficient to make the placing of religious life among the subjects for successful investigation a possibility.

Considered from the practical point of view, the psychology of religion may be expected to lay down foundations not only for a reformed dogmatics in closer agreement with the modern religious conscience, but also for a truer, and therefore a more effective, religious practice. To the Theologian and to the Pastor, a psychological investigation such as is here advocated is nothing less than a return to nature,<sup>1</sup> i. e., a return to the *ultimate* origin of religion. The cry for a return to the origin is a familiar one ; it has been one of the usual watch-words of the Christian Reformers. But with us, as in other religions, it has come to mean nothing more than a return to the *primitive* practices and beliefs. The superstition of the perfect adequacy for all men and consequent finality of the archetype is still upon us ; it is still an axiom with those who have remained within the Church. Thus it has come to pass that

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<sup>1</sup> We use the word *nature* not as it is often done to distinguish the physical from the psychical world, but as embracing both ; it is for us synonymous with *that which exists* in any and every order of existence.

religious consciousness is attired in the misfit garment of peoples of sensibilities and culture different from ours, nay, that it has in some measure been moulded by it, instead of itself shaping the garment. The psychology of religion is a return to nature *in its present truth*, a return to the ultimate fitness of things, through the investigation and critical study of the genuine needs of the individual and of the means that may best satisfy them. We hold this to be the question before us to-day. Guyau wrote a few years ago: "Formerly the question was whether religion is revealed or natural; to-day the question is whether religion is or is not true, whether it is or is not the product of an intellectual error, of a sort of inevitable optical illusion."<sup>1</sup> That the religious philosopher and scientist is to approach the religious problems from another, broader and more fertile point of view than the one which Guyau thought the latest and final one, will, we trust, be made clear in the sequel.

But we should not proceed further before having paid serious attention to the general conclusions reached by the religious philosophers. It has been a favorite custom with them to put up the concentrated results of their toil into little formulæ, commonly called *definitions* of religion. Although they evince most astonishing divergencies, extending even to hopeless contradiction, they will, when considered together and compared with each other, at least warn us away from certain false conceptions which have sadly obscured the view of otherwise clear-sighted men. It must be confessed that the definitions of religion would afford a happy topic for a malicious person bent upon showing the quackery of the Doctors in religion. Martineau, for instance, affirms that religion is "a belief in an Ever-living God, that is, in a Divine mind and will ruling the universe and holding moral relations with mankind"; Romanes chimes in and says: "To speak of the religion of the Unknowable, the religion of Cosmism, the religion of Humanity and so forth, where the personality of the First Cause is not recognised, is as unmeaning as it would be to speak of the love of a tri-

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<sup>1</sup> Guyau, *L'irreligion de l'avenir*.



angle, or the rationality of the equator;"<sup>1</sup> but Brinton flatly contradicts them both, saying: "No mistake could be greater than to suppose that every creed must teach a belief in a God or Gods, in an immortal soul and in a Divine government of the world. . . . The religion of to-day which counts the largest number of adherents, Buddhism, rejects every one of these items."<sup>2</sup> Theologians anathematise atheistic science, while its champions claim that "true science and true religion are twin sisters . . . science prospers exactly in proportion as it is religious," etc.,<sup>3</sup> or that "the discipline of science is superior to that of our ordinary education because of the religious culture it gives."<sup>4</sup> And there are those who regard religion, even in its crudest beginning, as the admirable manifestation of God in man, while others call it bluntly superstition, or the product of an intellectual error unavoidable in the infancy of mankind but to be overgrown as soon as possible. There is the Religion of Humanity, the Religion of Art, the Religion of Science, the Religion of Reason, the Religion of Cosmism. The Doctors have not yet risen to the dull harmony of omniscient agreement!

On examining the definitions of Religion, one finds that a psychological classification in three groups makes room for them all. Several other classifications are possible.<sup>5</sup> We give the preference to the following, because it brings into relief better than any other the faulty psychology which enters for so large a share in this lamentable confusion of ideas about Religion. In the first a specific intellectual element is given as the essence or as the distinguishing mark of Religion; in the second, it is one or several specific feelings which are singled out as the Religious Differentia; while in the third group the active principle, the cravings, the desires, the impulses, the will, take the place occupied by the intel-

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<sup>1</sup> G. J. Romanes, *Thoughts on Religion*.

<sup>2</sup> Brinton, *Religion of Primitive Peoples*.

<sup>3</sup> Huxley.

<sup>4</sup> Spencer's *Education*.

<sup>5</sup> See, for instance, that of Wundt (*Logic*, I., Chap. II.) in three groups: (1) the Autonomous theories (Schleiermacher's, for instance); (2) the Metaphysical theories (Spencer's and Hegel's); (3) the Ethical theory (Kant's).

lect or the feelings in the other classes. Religion becomes, in this view, an endeavor to realise a certain type of being, an instinct, a certain kind of actions, etc. Here are one or two definitions of each class by way of illustration, others will be found in the appendix.

Herbert Spencer finds the vital element of all religions in the realisation on the part of man, "that the existence of the world with all it contains and all which surrounds it is a mystery ever pressing for interpretation." We have already quoted Martineau. Romanes says, "Religion is a department of thought having for its objects a self-conscious and intelligent Being."—*Thoughts on Religion*. Goblet d'Alviella finds religion in "the belief in the existence of superhuman beings who interfere in a mysterious fashion in the destiny of man."—*The Idea of God*. Max Müller, whom we shall have occasion to quote later on, sees in religion the proof of the existence in man of a third faculty which he calls "simply" [!] the faculty of *apprehending the Infinite*.

In the second class the vital element is not a perception or a conception; it is not a matter of the intellect but of the feeling.

Schleiermacher is the best known of the representatives of this class. He denied in his speech on "The Nature of Religion" the thesis reaffirmed subsequently by the intellectualist school. "Religion," said he, "cannot and will not originate in the pure impulse to know. What we feel and are conscious of in religious emotion is not the nature of things, but their operation upon us. What you may know or believe about the nature of things is far beneath the sphere of religion . . . any effort to penetrate into the nature or substance of things is no longer religion, but seeks to be a science of some sort." The peculiar sphere of religion according to him is feeling. "It is neither thinking nor acting, but intuition and feeling." And speaking of the conception of God and of immortality, he wrote, "only what in either is feeling and immediate consciousness, can belong to Religion." In a subsequent work (*The Doctrine of Faith*) he reaches the well-known definition: "Religion is a feeling of absolute dependence."

Daniel Greenleaf Thompson wrote: "Religion is the aggre-

gate of those sentiments in the human mind arising in connexion with the relations assumed to subsist between the order of nature (inclusive of the observer) and a postulated supernatural."—*The Religious Sentiment of the Human Mind*. And Herbart: "Sympathy with the universal dependence of men is the essential natural principle of all religion."—*Science of Education*.

We have here the attitude of Faust:

"Nenn's Glück! Herz! Liebe! Gott!  
Ich habe keinen Namen  
Dafür, Gefühl ist alles."

The glaring one-sidedness of the preceding definitions has gradually been recognised, and, to-day, there is a marked tendency to bring forward and place the emphasis upon the desires and the will.

To the third class belongs Bradley's definition; he writes in *Appearance and Reality*, p. 453: "We have found that the essence of religion is not knowledge, and this certainly does not mean that the essence consists barely in feeling. Religion is rather the attempt to express the complete reality of goodness through every aspect of our being." Those of Feuerbach, Schopenhauer, Comte, Edward Caird, A. Sabatier, Daniel Brinton, Réville, H. M. Stanley,<sup>1</sup> Henry, R. Marshall, fall also into this group. The recent book of the last named author, *Instinct and Reason*, is concerned chiefly with religion. In it Marshall maintains that religion is an instinct on the whole directly disadvantageous to the individual, but beneficial to the race in that the instinctive religious activities imply restraint of individualism and greater subordination to the will of the whole. It is because of this racial value that religion has survived and become instinctive. This view is, as to its essential features, the antithesis of Schleiermacher's. While the latter is at pains to convince us that religion is "pure subjectivity," that "religion is

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<sup>1</sup> Stanley belongs rather to the second class. See his very suggestive paper in the *Psychological Review*, 1898, pp. 254-278, "On the Psychology of Religion." The reverential and worshipful emotion is for him the essence of Religion. The criticism we direct a little further on against Max Müller and Guyau is also applicable to him.

based on feeling alone," and that "by itself it does not urge men to activity at all," "it is morality which is based on action;" the former affirms that "the restraint of individual impulses to racial ones (the suppression of our will to a higher will)" seems "to be of the very essence of religion."<sup>1</sup>

In the third class might also be included the definitions of the few authors who refuse altogether to see in any one of the three partial manifestations of psychic life which we have been able to use separately as the basis of our classification, the particular *essence* of religion. The definitions of this type have so far acquired little influence for the reason that they have nowhere, as far as we are aware, been supported with a sufficient show of evidence, and especially because their meaning and the point of view they represent have not been systematically carried out into the problems of religious philosophy. The authors who have been ready to declare that "in the religious consciousness all sides of the whole personality participate," did not usually mean anything more than the truism admitted by everybody; they have none the less remained in an eccentric position. Pfeiderer, for instance, to whom belongs the quotation just made, writes soon after: "Of course we must recognise that knowing and willing are here [in religion] not ends in themselves, as in science and in morality, but rather subordinate to feeling, as the *real center* of religious consciousness."

How can so many different and even contradictory opinions be possible? How can they all be held and defended? It has no doubt occurred to the reader that the source of these divergences lies not so much in fundamental differences of opinion as to what in actual life deserves the name religion. On this we would find, we shall venture to say, most of our authors in agreement. It is to be found rather in a deficient understanding of psychical life in general. Intellectual curiosity, perception, reflexion, intuition, feel-

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<sup>1</sup> *Instinct and Reason*, p. 329. The preceding quotations are not sufficiently comprehensive to do justice to the authors cited. They may even be misleading. To prevent misinterpretations, as well as to present with more fullness some of the most interesting and typical opinions on religion, we give in an Appendix to this paper a summary of several of them. We have, moreover, added a large number of concise definitions of religion.

ing, belief, desire, volition, instinct, etc.,—each author has evidently a different idea of the meaning of these words, or, at least, of the function in life of that which they designate. Let two persons agree as to their general psychology and they could not be very far apart in their understanding of religion. A large part of the necessary ground work of a Philosophy of Religion is furnished by general psychology and another part by the psychological analysis of those particular experiences or manifestations called Religion. This is recognised, at least tacitly, by all philosophers, since their books contain long psychological considerations to prepare the way for the generalisations. Not infrequently the “Philosophy of Religion” turns out to be little more than more or less crude and flighty discussions of social religious psychology. It should be then openly admitted that the equipment of the Philosopher of Religion includes the acquisitions of psychological science and the training which the study of that science gives; let it be recognised frankly that the gifts of the mystic, the learning of the theologian and of the historian of philosophical thought, and the acuteness of the metaphysician are not sufficient to the task. Let us cease to act as if we believed in the methodological principle of classical philosophy: let the superstructure be built, the foundation will take care of itself.

If the philosopher of religion has listened to the lesson of history, he will look for light to psychological science before he undertakes the task so many have failed to achieve.

In spite of their insufficiency—evident to any one not under the spells cast over the thinking world by the intellectualistic and by the affectivistic philosophy—the definitions of the first and second class are still those which meet with the widest acceptance. Intellectualism in religion offers a beautiful illustration of the power of a long-established idea to exclude others, even though they be not inconsistent with it, and thus make us blind to half the facts pressing for recognition. Max Müller, for instance, needed the assaults of criticism to perceive that a mere “perception of the Infinite” could not fairly be called a religion. In his Gifford Lectures of 1888 on *Natural Religion* he assents to the criticism to

which his definition had been subjected, and adds to it, by way of amendment, the clause: "A perception of the Infinite under such manifestations as are able to influence the moral character of man." "The fact," says he, "was that in my former writings I was chiefly concerned with dogmatic Religion. . . . Still, I plead guilty to not having laid sufficient emphasis on the practical side of Religion; I admit that mere theories about the Infinite, unless they influence human conduct, have no right to the name of Religion." But this truth, although formally recognised by him, never acquired in his mind the full meaning belonging to it. He continued to write as if a bit of metaphysical speculation could constitute a religion.

Guyau is, in this respect, no less interesting. At the beginning of his book, *L'irreligion de l'avenir*, as he states that sociality is the basis of religion, and as he passes in review the one-sided conceptions of some of his predecessors and declares that Schleiermacher's and Feuerbach's definitions should be superposed, the reader feels assured that he has cut loose from the intellectualistic point of view. "The religious sentiment," says he, "is primarily no doubt a feeling of dependence. But this feeling of dependence, really to give birth to religion, must provoke in one a reaction,—a desire for deliverance." But Guyau, who, like Max Müller, is apparently able to see, when his attention is drawn to it, that an idea, a concept, a perception, in short, a mere intellectual fact, can by no means be singled out as the substance of religion, has nevertheless kept to the intellectualistic attitude. The conception which the book defends is that "religion is the outcome of an effort to explain all things—physical, metaphysical, and moral—by analogies drawn from human society, imaginatively and symbolically considered. In short it is a universal sociological hypothesis, mythical in form." An effort to *explain* is, for Guyau, the efficient cause of religion and an *explanation of the world's puzzle* is a religion. It is once again Spencer's definition with the addition of a statement concerning the analogy according to which the puzzle is explained.

Guyau, like so many others, has succumbed to the most dangerous illusion besetting the philosopher. Nothing can be so real and so persistent to the thinker as thought; it may even become

the only reality. The artist, the voluptuary, the mystic, never lose sight of the feelings, because in feeling they find their life; the man of action cannot forget the impulses, the desires, the will; but the philosopher, who is so only by virtue of his intellectual activity, is condemned by the very nature of his employment to intellectuallistic one-sidedness, unless the Gods have poured upon him all the treasures of the horn of plenty.

It is not the place here to point out the defects of intellectualism and the errors which it fosters, but we may well mention in passing two points deserving of special attention in a study of religion.

1. The habit of the intellectualistic philosopher of looking at life from the eccentric, one-sided point of view which make sensations and ideas appear in the foreground and reduces everything else to insignificant dimness, makes it impossible for him to take sufficiently into account the existence of unconscious activities and of their influence upon thought and action. He does not see that consciousness follows oftener than it leads, that it is an intermittent and heterogeneous light. Therefore neither those manifestations of religious life which are instinctive, nor the import of the feelings and beliefs connected with them can be properly understood by him. It cannot be said, for instance, that the beliefs connected with the several religious ceremonies and practices express always adequately their meaning and their purpose. It is often quite otherwise. Religious actions often have their root in inherited tendencies, the *raison d'être* of which, if ever conscious, has now lapsed, partly or wholly into the unconscious. And the actual beliefs connected with these performances are similar in point of irrationality to the notions by which certain insane persons sometime try to explain and to justify to themselves their deeds or their imaginary experiences.

2. One of the most mischievous of the particular evils wrought in religion by intellectualism is that the question of the existence of God has been forced upon the attention of the students of religion as the paramount and sometimes as the only religious problem, to the detriment of other inquiries. An ontological problem

has become in most minds synonymous with the religious problem: "The province of the philosophy of religion is to furnish a rational ground for the belief in God," says Otto Pfleiderer; and Professor Ladd in his introduction to Lotze's *Philosophy of Religion* writes: "The philosophy of religion is, of course, primarily a speculative or theoretical treatment of the proofs for the being of God, of his attributes, and of his relations to the world of matter and finite spirits." This task is no more than a fragment of the philosophy of religion; but to this point we shall return at a more opportune moment, merely recording here an emphatic protest against this opinion.

It must be said further that the question of the "existence" of God is not the real problem; it lives upon the interest felt by man in another, the true problem which has been, in part at least, lost sight of by the professional thinkers. It has thus happened that men have come to deceive themselves into the belief that they really care for the existence of a Personal First Cause or of a Moral Order in itself, while that with which they are concerned is solely their relation, and that of the world in which they live, to these possible existences. We are absolutely indifferent to the fate of the First Cause in as long as our own fate and that of the world surrounding and affecting us is not at stake. For this most normal and rational trait we need not blush. The ultimate queries we want answered when we consider the question of the existence of God, or of a Moral Order is one or several of the following: Shall I get the meat and drink I want and for which I am willing to pray? Shall the dear one be healed by a divine hand? Shall I get the moral support, the sense of fellowship after which my weak flesh yearns? Shall the right ultimately triumph? Is the matrix of the Universe of flesh only or is it animated by a spirit kindred to mine, a spirit which has built and is leading this world so as to satisfy my highest longings for universal harmony? When this is recognised the classical problem of the existence of God, hardened and pressed into ruts as it has become by centuries of stubborn but well-nigh fruitless effort at its solution, assumes a fresher aspect and offers new points of attack. The foremost questions asked will now be:



What does man expect from the existences in which he would like to believe? Are the needs of humanity to be satisfied only by the existence of, or through the belief in, a particular Being or Order, or can they be satisfied otherwise?

If, leaving aside the question of the adequacy of religious definitions, we ask what the possible value of a definition might be, the most that can be said is that its highest usefulness would be the one belonging to a class-description. It would hardly be worth the labor which has been bestowed upon the matter. It is a misfortune that the time and the talent consecrated to this end have not been directed towards the discovery of a germinal principle instead of that of a description; a principle corresponding to the evolutionary principles in biology, for instance. And further, if one looks closely into these definitions, one is struck with the quite unnecessary emptiness of most of them. What is the use of saying with Bradley that religion is the attempt to express the complete reality of goodness through every aspect of our being? The Sunday School child, who says religion is all that is good and right, is just as enlightening. And what is it that is meant when this or that is called the "essence" of Religion? Does essence mean that which in itself is sufficient to constitute religion? No, that cannot be. The thought of God, or of the Universe, conceived of as a whole of which I am a part, or some other such idea, must be present when the "feeling of dependance" is experienced. Schleiermacher himself would affirm this. And no one would venture to maintain that belief in God is, in this first sense, the essence of religion. Or does the expression mean that which is found nowhere else in man's life? Not one of the definitions using the word "essence" could be made to agree with this second interpretation without extending the bounds of religion beyond what the author of the definition himself would admit. Is "essence" synonymous with "the most prominent conscious factor," or with "the most important part" of religion? How could this third opinion be maintained, seeing how men differ, how, for one man, the characteristic religious experience is a voluptuous trance obtained by the fixation of the attention upon Christ, or some other religious ob-

ject; while for another the deepest religious experience lies in the preparation and performance of a benevolent action. As to the several "factors" of religious experience, who has ever seriously tried to estimate their relative value or importance? How is it to be done?—The word "essence" had better be left unused; it does not add anything definite enough to make its presence desirable in a definition of religion.

The vacant term *relation* is often used without any attempt at defining the kind of relation meant. Sometimes the relation binds two Infinites. Max Müller, in his *Theosophy*, page 360, informs us that religion is a bridge between the visible and material world and the invisible and spiritual world. That bridge is described as establishing a relation between the Infinite man discovers in nature and the Infinite man discovers in himself. These Infinites are such particular stuffs that a special faculty is needed for their apprehension; "there will be and can be no rest till we admit that there is in man a third faculty which I call simply the faculty of apprehending the Infinite, not only in religion, but in all things—a power independent of sense and reason, a power in a certain sense contradicted by sense and reason, but yet a very real power." There is something in this passage which makes one think of the Cabala. Who would not look upon the following definitions as farcical? (And yet they are neither better nor worse than many a famous religious definition.) Commerce is acquisitiveness touched with a feeling of dependence, or, commerce is a business relation. Morality is a social relation, or, morality is a belief in virtue. Virtue is an absolute feeling of dependence upon truth; and the like *ad libitum*.

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So much by way of criticism of religious definitions. And now along what route shall we proceed in our investigation of immediate religious experiences in order to reach a comprehensive understanding of religion? To find our cue we need only the guidance of the most significant and far-reaching achievement of modern psychology. It is the result of the co-operation of physiology and psychology and concerns the relation which has been found to exist between

what used to be called the "faculties" of the soul and physiological processes. When the conclusion that the reflex-arc was the type of all living activity had been reached ; and when it had been discovered that sensations were necessarily correlated with stimuli travelling along afferent nerves (the first segment of the reflex-arc); thought, reflexion, with the central nervous activity (the middle segment of the reflex-arc), and the manifestations of the will, with the stimuli travelling outwardly along efferent nerves to the muscles ; psychic life assumed at once a new aspect. It became evident that just as muscle-contraction (movement) is the natural and unavoidable end of a stimulus travelling along the reflex-arc, so on the psychic side, the will or the desire to act is the only normal end of consciousness ; while thinking is seen to be in Wm. James's<sup>1</sup> words merely a "place of transit" indicating the existence of complex possibilities as to the action of which reflexion is a precursor.

As to feeling, the other "element" of psychical life, it is looked upon either as being an attribute or an independent accompaniment of other psychical experiences. But, however that may be, it is agreed that it does not exist independently. It is always experienced together with sensation or idea. We reach therefore the conclusion that neither thought nor feeling exist for themselves ; they cannot be end in themselves, but exist only as part of a complex process ending in, or at least tending to, action—when objectively viewed.

Action and its psychical correlates and associates, craving, desiring, willing, which until the recognition of the psycho-physiological parallelism just stated was overshadowed by the intellect or the feelings, assumed from that time on a preponderant place in the theories of mental life. Schopenhauer, Wundt, and a host of younger men endeavored to recast the theories of psychic life around the will ; they chose the word *Voluntarism* to characterise their point of view. But this elevation of the will to a prominent place means at the same time, as we have shown, its co-ordination with

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<sup>1</sup> See his essay "Reflex-action and Theism" in *The Will to Believe and other Essays*.

the other psychic processes, since the co-relation existing between psychic life and the reflex-arc mechanism implies the organic unity of the triple psychical process. Neither one nor the other of the part-processes can be looked upon as the essence or the center of any particular pulse of psychic life; still less can any one of them be conceived as existing separately. To speak of any whole manifestation of life as being in its "essential" nature intellectual or affective or volitional, is to misconstrue the facts, for, although it is admitted that any expression of conscious life can be analysed into its successive moments, (sensation, reflective ideation, desires, impulses, will's determination, etc.,) and that one or the other of these constituents can be at times preponderantly present to the subject's consciousness, it does by no means follow that that particular pulse of life *is* an idea, or a volition, or a feeling, or that one or the other of these part-processes can properly be looked upon as the *essential nature* of the whole. A time sequence may exist, and, as a matter of fact, does exist: volition follows upon sensation and ideation. But this fact does not constitute volition the "essence" of psychic life. Such a deduction would be no better than the chemist's conclusion, that because water can be decomposed into hydrogen and oxygen, and that, from a certain point of view, oxygen is the most important of the two elements, therefore it is the characteristic component or the essence of water; and it would be no more correct for him to say that water, if considered as to its properties, is  $O+H$ . It is nothing of the kind: there is no likeness between the properties of the components and those of water. All this seems simple enough; it has become a matter of course to those who have been brought up in the atmosphere newly created by the psychological conception we have found necessary to outline above; but religious philosophy and religious science have so far, with insufficient exceptions, not yet undergone the recasting which its introduction makes necessary. Of this we have found abundant proof a little while ago.

In the sphere of religion this doctrine means not only that every pulse of religious life includes ideas and feelings but also that it finds its objective expression in action. The facts bear out this

conclusion. Religious life is found to manifest itself always and everywhere in actions, or at least in movements, as well as in thought and feeling. There is no experience of the individual consciousness which the subject is willing to call religious, which does not end in a deed.<sup>1</sup> Sacrificing, praying, the thousand and one fashions of worship, are outwardly perceivable religious actions. But even when there is no apparent external activity, even in the most "spiritual" worship, when the coarser outward appeal for help is not to be detected, even there religious experience finds its unavoidable bodily expression in an activity which can properly be regarded as the residuum of inhibited movements: prayer becomes a "lifting up of the heart to God," and the burning of incense is replaced by the "offering up" of one's talents, of one's life for Divine Service. In these subtle utterances of religious needs the final segment of the reflex-arc is just as surely, if not so obviously, present as in the offering of spotless lambs. There is, in the former as well as in the latter case, a will affirming a desire and the bodily concomitant thereof, i. e., movements, were it only the slight contractions and relaxations of the facial muscles making up a yearning countenance, inward speech, changes in the circulation of the blood, in the respiration, in secretions and all the varied muscular tensions which are part of the *in-tention* of the soul to reach God. These multiple activities are remnants of the once unrepressed and aggressive ways of men of lower civilisation when seeking assistance from the Divinity.

We have said that every pulse of religious life includes thinking and feeling. This is not always true. Inasmuch as action tends everywhere to become unconscious by habituation, we may expect to find at times certain religious activities performed automatically or instinctively. This point will receive consideration elsewhere.

The student of the psychology of religion has, then, before him as subject-matter complex psychological processes culminat-

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<sup>1</sup> In making this statement we anticipate one of the conclusions to be reached later.

ing actually or prospectively in certain classes of action called religious activities.

This is the first point we desire to bring in unmistakable prominence. How deeply and variously the implications of this view affect the general problem of the "nature" of religion, will become apparent as we proceed. At present we shall simply find in this idea the guiding line we are looking for. The first question asked in presence of an action, or of a class of actions, we wish to understand, is what was its motive and what was its end. This procedure, followed in the humdrum business of life, is also the right one for the psychologist of religion. Our first queries will therefore be concerning the motive or motives and the end or ends of religion. Subsequently we will pass on to the consideration of the "channel," or "channels," through which the religious ends are realised.

It will be found that the religious impulses, the religious needs and the religious ends are also the impulses, the needs and the ends of other activities, that they are not the exclusive possession of religious life; while the conception of the channel, or, to put it otherwise, the conception of the causal characteristics of the religious agent differentiates religious from non-religious activities.

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#### APPENDIX.

In this Appendix the reader will find a fuller critical exposition of the religious conceptions of Max Müller, Herbert Spencer, Schleiermacher and Henry R. Marshall, than the one which could find place in the body of the article. He will moreover find in it a number of opinions about religion taken from the works of other distinguished students of religion.

#### MAX MÜLLER.<sup>1</sup>

In the *Science of Religion* Max Müller wrote: Religion is "a mental faculty or disposition, which, independent of, nay in spite of, sense and reason, enables man to apprehend the Infinite under different names, and under varying disguises. Without that faculty, no religion, not even the lowest worship of idols and fetishes.

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<sup>1</sup> The quotations are from the *Origin of Religion*, lectures delivered in 1878. and from *The Science of Religion*, lectures delivered in 1870.

would be possible; and if we will but listen attentively, we can hear in all religions a groaning of the spirit, a struggle to conceive the inconceivable, to utter the unutterable, a longing after the Infinite, a love of God." That faculty he calls "Faith."

The use made in this book of the term "faculty" was vigorously attacked, and, yielding in a measure to the objections raised, he declared in the *Origin of Religion* that he does not mean to say that there is a separate religious consciousness; "when we speak of faith as a religious faculty in man, all that we can mean is our ordinary consciousness so developed and modified as to enable us to take cognizance of religious objects. . . . This is not meant as a new sense, . . . it is simply the old consciousness applied to new objects." If "faculty" is an ambiguous or dangerous word, he is perfectly ready to replace it by "potential energy" and to define the subjective side of Religion as "the potential energy which enables man to apprehend the infinite." That "faculty" or "potential energy," also called "Faith," is, like reason, a development of sensuous perceptions, but one of another sort. The human mind, according to Max Müller, is made of three "faculties" or "potential energies": Sense, Reason, and Faith. The two last named being different developments of sensuous perceptions. "Our apprehension of the Infinite takes place independently of, nay in spite of, sense and reason. Their objects transcend the apprehensive and comprehensive powers of our sense and our reason. The facts of Religion, subjective and objective, can be explained only by an appeal to that third potential energy." "We have in that perception of the infinite the root of the whole historical development of the human faith." (P. 43.) He admits that at first it is far from a clear perception.

What does Max Müller mean by "perception" and what does he mean by "Infinite," the two words on which depends the sense of his definition? The value of his conception of Religion hangs, it is evident, upon the possibility of putting some kind of definite meaning into these words. The only critical remarks we want to make here bear upon these two words. Perception seems at times in Max Müller's writings to involve feeling; perhaps even to be nothing more than a feeling-state. At other times it seems to be synonymous with apprehension; three terms which to-day not even a beginner in psychological science would confuse. On page 43, of the *Origin* he writes, for instance, "with every finite perception there is a concomitant perception, or, if that word should seem too strong, a concomitant sentiment or presentiment of the infinite."

We have already said elsewhere that criticism made him see, in an insufficient way, that a simple "*perception* of the Infinite" could not be called a religion and that he added to his definition "under such manifestations as are able to influence the moral character of man."

As to what "Infinite" stands for in man's experience he cannot well say. The word is useful, however, because vague and mysterious; it does well in a statement on the nature of Religion. Spencer, it will be recalled, denies, in his *First Prin-*

ciples, the possibility of thinking the Infinite, and therefore he holds that "Infinite" represents an illegitimate conception. At any rate, and whatever may be the meaning Max Müller was able to put for himself into that word, it is surely not communicated to the reader in any intelligible way. The only use of a word such as "Infinite" in a definition of Religion is to feed megalomania, an apparently unavoidable disease in man at a certain stage of self-consciousness. Those "who have no particular talent for the finite, but a general sense that the infinite is the right thing for them," will revel in the apprehension of the "Infinite," but as Felix Holt says of the Renés and Byrons, "they might as well boast of nausea as a proof of a strong inside."

It would have been difficult to frame a definition of Religion so impressive in appearance and at the same time so devoid of substance as the one to be found in the works of the learned Orientalist. If we have taken the trouble to examine it with some detail, it is only because it is still typical of the kind of ideas cherished by a large number of distinguished people, concerning the essence of Religion.

#### HERBERT SPENCER.

Herbert Spencer, in his *First Principles*, sets about reconciling Religion and Science upon terms of a real and permanent peace between them. It is this purpose which leads him to seek for the ultimate truth of Religion.

He begins with a critical examination of the essential religious conceptions, Atheism, Pantheism, Theism, and he finds that "when rigorously analysed they severally prove to be absolutely unthinkable." "Instead of disclosing a fundamental verity existing in each, our investigation seems rather to have shown that there is no fundamental verity contained in any." (P. 43.) But this is not his final conclusion: "We find [in every form of Religion] an hypothesis which is supposed to render the Universe comprehensible. Nay, even that which is commonly regarded as the negation of all Religion—even positive Atheism, comes within the definition; for it, too, in asserting the self-existence of Space, Matter, and Motion, which it regards as adequate causes of every appearance, propounds an *à priori* theory from which it holds the facts to be deducible. Now every theory tacitly asserts two things: first, that there is something to be explained; secondly, that such and such is the explanation. Hence, however widely different speculators may disagree in the solutions they give of the same problem, yet by implication they agree that there is a problem to be solved. Here then is an element which all creeds have in common. Religions, diametrically opposed in their overt dogmas, are yet perfectly at one in the tacit conviction that the existence of the world, with all it contains and all which surrounds it, is a mystery ever pressing for interpretation. On this point, if on no other, there is entire unanimity."

"That this is the vital element in all religions is further proved by the fact that it is the element which not only survives every change, but grows more distinct the more highly the religion is developed."



"Nor does the evidence end here. Not only is the omnipresence of something which passes comprehension, that most abstract belief which is common to all religions, which becomes the more distinct in proportion as they develop, and which remains after their discordant elements have been mutually cancelled; but it is that belief which the most unsparing criticism of each leaves unquestionable—or rather makes ever clearer. It has nothing to fear from the most inexorable logic; but, on the contrary, is a belief which the most inexorable logic shows to be more profoundly true than any religion supposes. For every religion, setting out though it does with the tacit assertion of a mystery, forthwith proceeds to give some solution of this mystery, and so asserts that it is not a mystery passing human comprehension. But an examination of the solutions they severally propound shows them to be uniformly invalid. The analysis of every possible hypothesis proves, not simply that no hypothesis is sufficient, but that no hypothesis is even thinkable. And thus the mystery, which all religions recognise, turns out to be a far more transcendent mystery than any of them suspect—not a relative, but an absolute, mystery.

"Here, then, is an ultimate religious truth of the highest possible certainty." (Pp. 43, 44, 45, 46.)

What the place occupied by the feeling is in this intellectualistic interpretation, is not altogether clear. But this at least is made evident: it is not the "vital element" of religion. The feelings which "respond" to religious ideas are the religious feelings.

The primary dependence of religion upon the recognition of the great Mystery is once more emphasised in the chapter on "The Reconciliation," in which he declares that what makes a religion become more religious is that it "rejects those definite and simple interpretations of nature previously given." "That which in religion is irreligious is, that, contradicting its deepest truth, it has all along professed to have some knowledge of that which transcends knowledge; and has so contradicted its own teachings," its supreme verity.

Müller and Spencer are not so far apart as the first impression might suggest. The differences between them are those separating men who would have reached the same conclusion if one of them had not remained entangled on the way. Max Müller affirms nothing which cannot be brought into substantial agreement with Spencer's opinion, provided the former be interpreted in the light of the clearer consciousness of the latter. Let, first, the words "perception," "apprehension," "sentiment," used interchangeably by the former be dismissed and replaced by "recognition"; and, secondly, let "Infinite" be interpreted as meaning the ultimate mystery of things and they will find themselves in agreement. This benevolent interpretation of Max Müller will not appear altogether illegitimate when we recall that he designates the faculty by which we apprehend the Infinite "Faith," and also that he sees no objection to regarding the Infinite as an object of "sentiment" rather than an object of "perception."

One critical remark only we shall pass upon Spencer's view of religion. Granted that there is a "Mystery ever pressing for interpretation"; granted also that man strives after its interpretation; the vital element of religion has not yet been reached. It will not be found until the further inquiry is answered: why that inquisitiveness of man? Why is it that having once recognised the Mystery he does not let it alone; why does he want to understand, to explain it? The answer to this question would bring us at least a step nearer the heart of the problem. Spencer stops short of it as the true intellectualist that he is.

SCHLEIERMACHER.<sup>1</sup>

To prevent a possible misunderstanding, let it be said at the start that Schleiermacher did not believe that feeling could exist independently of the other mental processes. He says explicitly of perception, feeling and activity, that "they are not identical and yet are inseparable."

Religion consists for Schleiermacher in certain feelings holding a definite relation to the life of action (Morality) and to the life of thought (Science, Philosophy). Religion is passivity, it is contemplation. By itself it does not urge men to activity at all. "If you could imagine it implanted in man quite alone, it would produce neither these nor any other deeds. The man . . . would not act, he would only feel." (P. 57.) If Religion does not belong to the world of action, it does not any more belong to the world of thought: "Religion cannot and will not originate in the pure impulse to know. What we feel and are conscious of in religious emotions is not the nature of things, but their operation upon us. What you may know or believe about the nature of things is far beneath the sphere of Religion." (P. 48.) He makes, very legitimately, a sharp distinction between the ideas which arise when the feelings are made the objects of reflexion and the feelings themselves: "If you call these ideas," says he, "religious principles and ideas, you are not in error. But do not forget that this is scientific treatment of Religion, knowledge about it, and not Religion itself." (Pp. 46 and 47.)

These two points, viz., that Religion is not morality and that it is not knowledge, are persistently emphasised in Schleiermacher's writings. It does not appear so clearly how the feelings which constitute Religion are generated and how they differ from the non-religious feelings. "Your feeling," says he, "is piety,—[a word for him synonymous with Religion]—in so far as it expresses . . . the being and life common to you and to the All." (P. 45.) Religion is the feeling produced upon us by any particular object, i. e., by any part of the Universe, *when it is received, felt, as a part of the whole*, "not as limited and in opposition to other

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<sup>1</sup> The quotations will be chiefly from the second of the *Speeches on Religion* ("The Nature of Religion"), as translated from the 2nd edition by John Oman, London, 1893.

things, but as an exhibition of the Infinite in our life. Anything beyond this, any effort to penetrate into the nature and substance of things is no longer religion, but seeks to be a science of some sort." (P. 49.) A little further he tries again to describe the kind of apprehension which determines the religious feeling: "The sum total of Religion is to feel that, in its highest unity, everything that stirs our emotions is one in feeling; to feel that aught single and particular is only possible by means of this unity; to feel, that is to say, that our being and living is a being and living in and through God." He adds, "but it is not necessary that the Deity should be presented as also one distinct object." (P. 50.) Within the limits set in the preceding quotations, i. e., provided the feeling stirred by the particular object reveals the Unity of the Whole, every feeling is Religion. This, then, is clearly affirmed in the discourse on the "Nature of Religion," that it is the action of particular things upon us which underlies all religious emotions; we cannot "have" Religion unless it be through the influence exercised upon us by concrete, particular things.

In the *Christliche Glaubenslehre* Schleiermacher gives a definition of Religion differing in its wording from the one we have found in the *Reden*. It is in this later work that he reached the formula that has had so much success "the essence of religion consists in the feeling of an absolute dependence." To render fully his thought, the words "upon the Universe," or "upon God," should be added. This is simply an addition, not a negation, or even an alteration, of the earlier statement. He had said "Religion is feeling," it is the feeling generated in us by single experiences when viewed as intimations of the Whole of which they are parts. But he had not said what kind of feeling would be produced under these circumstances. In the *Glaubenslehre* he goes further and states that the intuition of the Whole through the presentation of a particular object produces a feeling of dependence. It will be a feeling of dependence because in these experiences man realises that the reaction called forth by the particular object is utterly insufficient, since at bottom it is a reaction by which he tries to meet, not the particular thing which has called it forth, but the Whole which it represents.

In his earlier writings Schleiermacher avoided the word "God" and was satisfied to use impersonal terms: the All, the Whole, the Universe, the Infinite. Later on the word God appeared and we find him making a distinction between the Universe and God which previously he does not seem to have had in mind. He distinguishes between the Whole as an aggregate of mutually conditioned parts of which we ourselves are one, and the Unity underneath this coherence which conditions all things and conditions our relations to the other parts of the Whole.

Schleiermacher agrees both with Max Müller and with Spencer in that (1) he finds the essence or the vital element of religion outside of morality, (2) he separates religion from knowledge of the nature of things. Moreover all three recognise the Mystery. They differ in that Schleiermacher finds the substance of religion in the *feeling* our dependence upon the Universe excites in us, while Spencer

considers the *recognition* of the Mystery the vital element. As to Max Müller he stands somewhere in the hazy between.

HENRY RUTGERS MARSHALL.<sup>1</sup>

In passing to Marshall, we enter upon new ground. Schleiermacher, Max Müller, and Spencer, in spite of considerable differences, evince at bottom a family resemblance; Marshall's view shows another pedigree. It reflects the tendency of recent psychology to turn from ideas and feelings to the actions of which they are the antecedents or the consequents.

Considering religion objectively, he concludes that it consists in those special activities which imply restraint of individualism, and that these activities, or at least the general tendencies from which they spring, are instructive. "The restraint of individualistic impulses to racial ones (the suppression of our will to a higher will) seems to me to be of the very essence of religion: the belief in the Deity, as usually found, being from the psychological point of view an attachment to, rather than of the essence of, the religious feeling." (P. 329.)<sup>2</sup>

Marshall's argument in support of the instructiveness of religion runs somewhat as follows: Religion is not, on the whole, advantageous to the individual; on the contrary it is in most cases clearly detrimental and would therefore not have remained as a factor in human societies if it was not advantageous to the race. As a matter of fact the religious activities are found on examination to be both detrimental to the individual and advantageous to the race. Now, the way in which practices of this description remain in general existence is through the survival of the fittest race. This implies the establishment of the practices, or at least of the tendencies, leading to them, as instinct.

It will appear in what precedes that Marshall includes under "Instinct" not only congenital activities *relatively definite*, as is commonly done, but also activities varying widely from each other. "The definiteness and the fixity of the actions is of very secondary moment, that which is important being the fact that there exists a biological end which determines the trend of these organised activities." It is only in this wider sense that religion may be called an instinct.

The theories put forth in *Instinct and Reason* concerning the nature and the function of religion are very interesting; they emphasise a side too much neglected, but they are not convincing. That religious activities are of value to the race, we may well believe, but that they are on the whole detrimental to the individual is by no means proven. This conclusion of our author seems the result of an insufficient investigation of religious life. A strong wish to put through a captivating

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<sup>1</sup> *Instinct and Reason*. Macmillan, 1898.

<sup>2</sup> See, for comparison, Benjamin Kidd's *Social Evolution*, p. 103, and Hiram M. Stanley's paper "On the Psychology of Religion," in the *Psychological Review* for 1893.

theory may have closed his eyes to the many obvious facts which militate against his opinion. The facts upon which he places the emphasis, seclusion, vision, fasting, one side of prayer, one side of sacrifice, do not represent adequately religious life.

The instinctive nature of religion is by no means demonstrated in the long argumentation devoted to it. The whole matter turns, it seems to us, upon the meaning to be attached to the expression *the tendencies to the main drift* of the actions by which a particular biological end is realised. These tendencies alone and not the activities themselves, let us remember, need be instinctive in the opinion of the author. What the expression means is not very clear. In the only sense we can give it, every human activity whatsoever, and not only the religious one, may be said to be directed, in a way, by an instinctive tendency. If no more than this is meant, then, the statement that religion is instinctive is thoroughly commonplace and undoubtedly true.

DANIEL G. BRINTON.<sup>1</sup>

"There is no belief or set of beliefs which constitute a religion. We are apt to suppose that every creed must teach a belief in a God, or Gods, in an immortal soul and in a divine government of the World. . . . No mistake could be greater. The religion which to-day counts the largest number of adherents, Buddhism, rejects every one of these items." (P. 28.)

After reviewing the principal theories of the origin of Religion he expresses his own opinion as follows: "The real explanation of the origin of religion is simple and universal. . . . It makes no difference whether we analyse the superstitions of the rudest savages, or the lofty utterances of John the Evangelist or of Spinoza the 'God-intoxicated philosopher'; we shall find one and the same postulate to the faith of all.

"This universal postulate, the psychic origin of all religious thought, is the recognition, or, if you please, the assumption, *that conscious volition is the ultimate source of all Force*. It is the belief that behind the sensuous, phenomenal world, distinct from it, giving it form, existence and activity, lies the ultimate, invisible, immeasurable power of Mind, of conscious Will, of Intelligence, analogous in some way to our own; and,—mark this essential corollary,—*that man is in communication with it*.

"What the highest religions thus assume was likewise the foundation of the earliest and most primitive cults. The one universal trait amid their endless forms of expression was the unalterable faith in Mind, in the super-sensuous, as the ultimate source of all force, all life, all being." (Pp. 47 and 48.)

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<sup>1</sup> The quotations are taken from "Religions of Primitive Peoples," the *American Lectures on the History of Religions* for 1896-1897. Putnam Sons. 1897.

In his earlier book, *The Religious Sentiment*, p. 79, Brinton gave the following definition: "Expectant attention directed toward an event not under known control, with a concomitant idea of Cause and Power."

HEGEL defines religion as "The knowledge possessed by the finite mind of its nature as absolute mind."

In the opening pages of the *Philosophy of Religion* he describes religion in an eloquent passage: "It is the realm where all enigmatical problems of the world are solved; where all contradictions of deep, musing thoughts are unveiled and all pangs of feeling soothed. . . . The whole manifold of human relations, activities, joys, everything that man values and esteems, wherein he seeks his happiness, his glory, and his pride—all find their final middle point in religion, in the thought, consciousness and feeling of God. God is therefore the beginning and the end of everything. . . . By means of religion man is placed in relation to this center, in which all his other relations converge, and is elevated to the realm of highest freedom, which is its own end and aim. This relation of freedom on the side of feeling is joy which we call beatitude; . . . on the side of activity its sole office is to manifest the honor and to reveal the glory of God, so that man in this relation is no longer chiefly concerned with himself, his own interests and vanity, but rather with the absolute end and aim."<sup>1</sup>

KANT. "Religion is (considered subjectively) the recognition of all our duties as divine commands."—*Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft*, Viertes Stück, erster Theil.

COMENIUS. "By religion we understand that inner veneration by which the mind of man attaches and binds itself to the supreme Godhead."—*Great Didactic* Keatings tr., p. 190.

HOBBS. "The natural seed of religion lies in these four things: the fear of spirits, ignorance of secondary causes, the conciliation of those fears and the assumption of accidents for omens."—*Leviathan, De Homine*.

HUME. "We may conclude therefore that in all nations the first ideas of religion arose not from a contemplation of the works of nature, but from a concern with regard to the events of life and fears which actuate the human mind."—*The Natural History of Religions*.

HERBART. "Sympathy with the universal dependence of men is the essential natural principle of all religion."—*Science of Education*, Felkin's tr., p. 171.

COMTE. "Religion, then, consists in regulating each one's individual nature, and forms the rallying point for all the separate individuals.

"To constitute a complete and durable harmony what is wanted is really to bind together man's inner nature by love and then to bind the man to the outer world by faith. Such, generally stated, is the necessary participation of the heart to the synthetical state, or unity, of the individual or the society."—*Catechism of Positive Religion*, pp. 46 and 51.

MARTINEAU understands by religion "the belief in an ever-living God, that is, in a Divine Mind and Will ruling the Universe and holding moral relations with mankind."—Introduction to *A Study of Religion*.

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<sup>1</sup> Quoted from Sterrett's *Studies in Hegel's Philosophy of Religion*.

RÉVILLE. "Religion rests above all upon the need of man to realise an harmonious synthesis between his destiny and the opposing influences he meets in the world."—*La religion des peuples non-civilisés*, Vol. I., p. 120.

ROMANES. "The distinguishing features of any theory which can properly be termed a religion is that it should refer to the ultimate source or sources of things; that it should suppose this source to be an objective, intelligent, and personal nature. . . . To speak of the Religion of the Unknowable, the Religion of Cosmism, the Religion of Humanity and so forth, where the personality of the First Cause is not recognised, is as unmeaning as it would be to speak of the love of a triangle, or the rationality of the equator.

"Religion is a department of thought having for its object a self-conscious and intelligent Being."—*Thoughts on Religion*.

PFLEIDERER. "In the religious consciousness all sides of the whole personality participate. Of course we must recognise that knowing and willing are here not ends in themselves as in science and morality, but rather subordinated to feeling as the real centre of religious consciousness. . . . This is not a simple feeling but a combination of feelings of freedom and dependence."—"The Notion and Problem of the Philosophy of Religion," *Philos. Rev.*, Jan., 1893.

EDWARD CAIRD. "Without as yet attempting to define religion . . . we may go as far as to say that a man's religion is the expression of his ultimate attitude to the Universe, the summed-up meaning and purport of his whole consciousness of things."—*Evolution of Religion*, Vol. I., p. 30.

D. G. THOMPSON means by religion "the aggregate of those sentiments in the human mind arising in connexion with the relations assumed to subsist between the order of nature (inclusive of the observer) and a postulated supernatural."—*The Religious Sentiment of the Human Mind*.

JEVONS. "Religion as a form of thought is the perception of the invisible things of Him through the things that are made."—*History of Religion*.

BENJAMIN KIDD. "A religion is a form of belief providing an ultra-rational sanction for that large class of conduct in the individual where his interests and the interests of the social organism are antagonistic and by which the former are rendered subordinate to the latter in the general interests of the evolution which the race is undergoing."—*Social Evolution*, p. 103.

BRADLEY. "But, on the other side, we have found that the essence of religion is not knowledge. And this certainly does not mean that its essence consists barely in feeling. Religion is rather the attempt to express the complete reality of goodness through every aspect of our being. And, so far as it goes, it is at once something more, and therefore something higher, than philosophy."—*Appearance and Reality*, p. 453.

WM. JAMES. "A man's religious faith (whatever more special items of doctrine it may involve) means for me essentially his faith in the existence of an unseen order of some kind in which the riddles of the natural order may be found explained."—"Is Life Worth Living?" in *The Will to Believe and Other Essays*.

UPTON. "It is the felt relationship in which the finite self-consciousness stands to the immanent and universal ground of all being, which constitutes religion."—"The Basis of Religious Belief," *Hibbert Lectures* for 1893.

A. SABATIER. "That which we call religion in a man is the sentiment of the

relation in which he stands and wants to stand to the universal principle upon which he knows himself to be dependent, and to the universe itself of which he finds himself a part.

"A filial feeling towards God and a fraternal feeling towards man is what makes the Christian."—*Esquisse d'une philosophie de la religion d'après la psychologie et l'histoire*, pp. 183 and 185.

WM. RALPH INGE. "Our consciousness of the beyond is, I say, the raw material of all religion."—"Christian Mysticism," *Bampton Lectures* for 1899.

HIRAM M. STANLEY. "We take it then that religion must be biologically defined as a specific mode of reaction to high superiorities of environment, or psychologically as a perception of a highly superior being, leading to a peculiar mode of emotion and will toward that being, and thus securing the most advantageous action. . . . The reverential and worshipful emotion spent is the essence of religion, and wherever this is found among the lowest animals, or the highest specimens of mankind, there is religion."—"On the Psychology of Religion," *Psychol. Rev.*, 1898, p. 258.

RENAN. "My Religion is now as ever the progress of reason, in other words the progress of science."—Preface to *The Future of Science*.

J. H. LEUBA.

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